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COMMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Requirement of Notice in Visual
Opacity Readings-Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114 (1974)
INTRODUCTION
On June 4, 1969, an inspector from the Division of Adminis-
tration of the Colorado Department of Health made observations
on the premises of Western Alfalfa Corporation without notice,
warrant, or consent. Approximately two weeks later Western re-
ceived a cease and desist order from the Division notifying it that
three of the corporation's plants in northern Colorado were in
violation of the Air Pollution Control Act.' A subsequent Air Pol-
lution Variance Board hearing found that a violation had oc-
curred, but the District Court of Weld County set aside this deter-
mination.2 In affirming the district court judgment, the Colorado
Court of Appeals held that the observations made by the State
Health Inspector constituted an unreasonable search and that the
failure to notify Western that observations were being made on
its premises led to a denial of due process at the hearing before
the Air Pollution Variance Board.' The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari and, speaking through Justice
Douglas, concluded that no violation of the fourth amendment
had occurred, and remanded the case to the Colorado Court of
Appeals for rulings on any other issues.4
' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-29-1 to -6 (Supp. 1967), as amended, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 66-31-1 to -16 (Supp. 1971). All observations were made for a period in excess of
3 minutes, and all readings were alleged to be darker in shade than a No. 2 on the
Ringelmann Chart and equivalent to an opacity of 40 percent, in violation of the provisions
of COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-5(2) (Supp. 1967). The Ringelmann test, a visual mea-
surement of the density of black smoke, has been incorporated into air pollution enforce-
ment statutes in the United States since 1910 when it appeared in the Boston Ordinance.
See Kennedy & Porter, Air Pollution: Its Control and Abatement, 8 VAND. L. REV. 854,
866 (1955). Many statutes like the Colorado statute allow for equivalent opacity readings
which correlate the percentage of obscuration of white smoke (visual opacity) with that
of black smoke (under the Ringelmann test). See City of Portland v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co., 3 Ore. App. 352, 357, 472 P.2d 826, 828 (1970), for a collection of cases approving the
use of the Ringelmann Chart.
Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., Civil No. 19974 (Colo. Dist.
Ct., filed Nov. 18, 1971). COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-13 (Supp. 1967), as amended,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-17 (Supp. 1971), provides for judicial review of a final order
of the Air Pollution Variance Board.
3 Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., 510 P.2d 907 (Colo. Ct. App.
1973).
Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 94 S.Ct. 2114 (1974).
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Western's challenge to the Division's investigatory proce-
dures brought into focus significant constitutional issues in the
enforcement of environmental quality laws. The purpose of this
comment is to analyze the fourth amendment doctrines which led
the Supreme Court to conclude that visual opacity readings are
not constitutionally prohibited searches and to further explore
this yet unsettled due process/notice issue. It is concluded that
the open fields and plain view doctrines properly exclude observa-
tions such as the Ringelmann test from the protection of the
fourth amendment, but that due process requires notice to be
given to potential violators shortly after such readings are made.
I. THE COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The Air Pollution Control Act as it existed when the inspec-
tion occurred, allowed Division personnel to enter and inspect
any property for the purpose of investigating an actual or sus-
pected source of air pollution.' Neither notice nor a warrant was
specifically required. The cease and desist order of June 16 was
the first notification Western received that tests had been con-
ducted on its premises and that its emissions had been found to
be in excess of the statutory maximum. After filing a denial with
the Variance Board that a violation had occurred,6 Western re-
tained an independent engineering firm to make a particulate
study of its plant emissions.' Though both the district court and
the court of appeals considered the particulate study more sophis-
ticated than the Ringelmann test,' the Variance Board refused to
accept the study.'
' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-8(2)(d) (Supp. 1967) provided authority for entrance
on the premises to make inspections. This section was amended in the 1969 session of the
legislature to require that a warrant or consent be obtained before entry on the premises.
See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-8(2)(d) (Supp. 1969). This provision now appears in
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-10(2)(d) (Supp. 1971).
6 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-10(4) (Supp. 1967), as amended, COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 66-31-13(4) (Supp. 1971).
This test was made in August, 1969.
The district court termed the particulate study a "more precise test of pollutant
emissions." Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., Civil No. 19974 (Colo.
Dist. Ct., filed Nov. 18, 1971). The court of appeals called the study a "sophisticated test."
Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., 510 P.2d 907, 909 (Colo. Ct. App.
1973).
' COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-5(2)(e) (Supp. 1969) requires that the method of
testing used by independent engineering firms be acceptable to the Division. Division
personnel must be present at the time of testing to determine the acceptability of the test,
but in this case Western did not notify them. There is, however, no reciprocal provision
which allows company representatives to be present when the Division makes inspections.
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Citing Camara v. Municipal Court"0 and See v. City of
Seattle, I the court of appeals concluded that "the act of conduct-
ing tests on the premises of Western without either a warrant or
the consent of anyone from Western, constituted an unreasonable
search." 2
The court of appeals also found a violation of due process in
that Western was unable to present rebuttal evidence at the hear-
ing before the Variance Board due to the "secret nature of the
investigation."' 3 The Air Pollution Control Act provides that vio-
lations of the kind Western was accused may be based upon the
aggregation of emissions in three minutes of any hour.'4 As ap-
plied by the Variance Board, this provision of the Act is of critical
significance in determining whether a violation of the Act has
occurred. The Board in this case focused attention on the three
minutes of the hour in question and excluded, for probative pur-
poses, evidence collected at any other time. Thus, the Board did
not consider Western's evidence of its emission levels in August
as probative rebuttal evidence to the Division's conclusions of the
emission levels in June. 5
The court of appeals pointed out that the evidence by its
nature was continually dissipating." Implicit in this observation
was the realization that since Western had no knowledge of the
tests made on June 4, it had no opportunity to gather evidence
that could successfully rebut the findings of the Division. The
failure of the Division to notify Western that tests were being
conducted resulted in a lack of due process at the hearing level
because Western was foreclosed from presenting rebuttal evi-
dence. The court concluded that it is mandatory in cases of this
kind that the accused party be made aware of the taking of tests
and measurements on its premises at the time they are made. 7
10 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Camara upheld a citizen's right to refuse a warrantless inspec-
tion of his home for possible violations of city housing regulations in non-emergency
situations. This decision overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which had
held that warrantless searches designed to enforce health regulations were not subject to
fourth amendment prohibition provided they were conducted at a reasonable time and
place.
11 387 U.S. 541 (1967). A companion case to Camara, See applied the Camara rule to
administrative searches of commercial premises.
12 510 P.2d at 909-10.
IS Id. at 909.
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-5(a) (Supp. 1967), as amended, CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 66-31-11(1) (Supp. 1971).




The court did not limit this mandate to the facts of Western,
where the observer was on the defendant's premises, but implied
that notice should be given even if the observer conducts the tests
from off the premises.
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court was handed down
on May 20, 1974.18 Justice Douglas quickly cleared the air sur-
rounding the issue of whether an unreasonable search occurred at
Western. Citing Hester v. United States,9 the Court determined
that tests of this kind fall within the open fields exception to the
fourth amendment.20 Comparing this inspection to those under
the Noise Control Act of 197221 (where an inspector may enter a
railroad right-of-way to determine whether noise standards are
being violated), the Court found that this kind of inspection can-
not be said to constitute an invasion of privacy. "The invasion of
privacy . . .if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoreti-
cal. ' '22 Confining the Camara and See cases to their facts, Justice
Douglas found them inapplicable to the factual situation in Air
Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.:
The field inspector did not enter the plant or offices. He was not
inspecting stacks . . .boilers, scrubbers, flues, grates, or furnaces;
nor was his inspection related to respondent's files or papers. He had
sighted what anyone in the city who was near the plant could see in
the sky-the plumes of smoke.13
Having settled the fourth amendment issue, the Court chose
to sidestep the due process question, noting that perhaps the air
surrounding this issue is not as clear.
Whether the Court [of Appeals] referred to Colorado "due process"
or Fourteenth Amendment "due process" is not clear. If it is the
former, the question is a matter of state law beyond our purview.
Since we are unsure of the grounds of that ruling we intimate no
opinion on that issue. But on our remand we leave open that and
any other question that may be lurking in the case.2"
Justice Douglas left unsettled what is probably the more nagging
issue in the case. Contrary to newspaper reports at the time the
Is 94 S. Ct. 2114, 2115-16 (1974).
" 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
- 94 S. Ct. 2114, 2116 (1974).
21 42 U.S.C. § 4901-18 (Supp. II, 1972).
" 94 S. Ct. at 2116.
21 Id. at 2115.
2 Id. at 2116 (footnotes omitted).
[VOL. 51
NOTICE IN VISUAL OPACITY TESTS
decision was handed down, 5 the Supreme Court did not settle for
all purposes the question of whether notice should be given when
visual opacity readings are made.
While the statute as it existed on June 4, 1969, permitted
entry onto an alleged violator's premises to make an inspection, 6
this section was amended in the 1969 session of the Colorado
Legislature to require a warrant or consent before entry is made
on the premises. 7 This amendment seems to satisfy any notice
problem as long as the inspection is conducted on a person's
property, premises, or place as was the case in Western. But what
if the inspection is made from the property of an adjoining
landowner or property owned by the public such as an adjacent
public highway or right-of-way? The mandate of the court of
appeals that searches of this kind (meaning visual opacity inspec-
tions) be made only with notice seems capable of compassing all
such searches whether made from on or off premises. But neither
the statute nor either of the opinions has squarely confronted the
issue.
III. DID THE INSPECTION CONSTITUTE AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH?
The warrantless administrative inspections in the Camara
and See cases involved attempts to enter enclosed structures to
recover evidence contained therein. The Western inspection, by
contrast, was not an attempt to enter an enclosed structure but
was confined solely to the premises or grounds surrounding the
plants. The issue was, then, does the entrance of an inspector
upon the grounds surrounding a commercial structure for the
purpose of obtaining evidence open to the public eye constitute
an unreasonable search prohibited by the fourth amendment?"
" The Denver Post, May 20, 1974, at 4, col. 2 stated: "Authorities needn't obtain
search warrants or give advance notice to go onto the property of potential polluters to
make inspections, provided they make the inspections from areas open to the public, the
Supreme Court ruled Monday." The Rocky Mountain News, May 21, 1974, at 1, col. 1
concluded, "the high court rejected the view that state officials must obtain either a search
warrant or consent of the owner before taking pollution readings at a commercial or
industrial site. Inspectors may enter the property of suspected pollutors as long as they
don't invade areas normally closed to the public, the court ruled."
" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-8(2)(d) (Supp. 1967).
27 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-8(2)(d) (Supp. 1969) "except that if such entry or
inspection is denied or not consented to and no emergency exists, the division is empow-
ered to and shall obtain from the district or county in which such property, premise or
place is located, a warrant to enter and inspect any such property, premise, or place prior
to entry and inspection."
U The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
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The fourth amendment's provision for protection of one's
person, house, papers, and effects amounts to protection of one's
privacy against unreasonable governmental intrusion., There-
fore, the fourth amendment offers protection only to those activi-
ties in which one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. This
principle was announced in Katz v. United States,3" a case which
attempted to remodel traditional methods of applying fourth
amendment problems. Prior to Katz, courts were consistently
troubled by the requirement that a trespass-a physical penetra-
tion of a constitutionally protected area-was necessary before a
search could be found unreasonable."1 With the development of
sophisticated electronic aids, it became apparent that one's pri-
vacy could be invaded without an actual physical intrusion.
32
Katz purported to offer a solution to the trespass requirement in
search and seizure cases. At issue were the activities of govern-
ment agents who electronically listened to and recorded the de-
fendant's telephone conversation in a public telephone booth.
Under the traditional requirements of trespass, no unreasonable
search had taken place because there was no physical invasion of
a constitutionally protected area. Nevertheless, it was apparent
that the defendant's privacy had been invaded. Discarding the
trespass requirement, the Court found that once a person's justifi-
able reliance on privacy had been invaded, an unreasonable
search had taken place. 3 The concurring opinion indicated that
there must be an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and
that expectation must be recognized as reasonable by society .3
Relieving future courts of the outdated trespass requirement,
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
" McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
"o Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
"' Since the common law was unexposed to non-trespassory (electronic) intrusion of
one's privacy, it was not unusual that an actual physical invasion was thought necessary
under the traditional analysis. See Mascolo, The Role of Functional Observations in the
Law of Search and Seizure: A Study in Misconception, 71 DIcK. L. REV. 380, 381 (1967).
31 Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968, 972 (1968).
u 389 U.S. at 353. Here it was held:
[Ellectronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated
the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth
and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
31 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Katz concluded that the protection offered by the fourth amend-
ment was for people (and their privacy), not places. 5 Subsequent
decisions, however, indicate that it is almost impossible to deter-
mine whether a person's privacy has been invaded without taking
account of the place. The problem is expressed by one writer who
said:
[Tihe mechanics of applying the fourth amendment must of ne-
cessity be concerned with protecting private places .... [Tihe
courts, despite contrary assertions, have uniformly continued to
treat searches and seizures as violations of private places .... A'
One's reasonable expectation of privacy is then, at least in
part, a function of the nature of the invaded area. If the invaded
area is not one which has been traditionally considered constitu-
tionally protected, then it is very difficult to successfully argue
that an officer's intrusion into that area violates the privacy of the
person, activity, or other evidence found within the area. Any
consideration of the protection offered by the fourth amendment
to the person must of necessity take into account the nature of
the place. The observations made at Western must be measured
against this background.
A. Open Fields Doctrine
Hester v. United States37 established the rule that "the spe-
cial protection accorded by the fourth amendment to the people
in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' is not extended to
the open fields."3 In Hester, officers conducted initial observa-
tions from and entered onto an open field without a warrant to
seize evidence of concealed distilled spirits from the defendant.
According to Hester, open fields are not "constitutionally pro-
tested areas." There, in contrast to Katz, the area, not the person,
defined the boundaries of fourth amendment protection.
The officers in Hester were trespassers, but the Court de-
clared it immaterial that a trespass was committed in the seizure
of the evidence in the open field.3 Under the Hester rationale,
' Id. at 351.
" Note, Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REv. 154,
175-76 (1972). See also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); United States v.
Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784, 791-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp.
425, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Zamora v. People, 175 Colo. 340,344,487 P.2d 1116, 1118 (1971);
People v. Ortega, 175 Colo. 136, 139, 485 P.2d 894, 896 (1971).
265 U.S. 57 (1924).
Id. at 59.
" Id. at 58. See also Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450, 456 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958) which held: "When the performance of his duty requires an
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then, it is of no significance that the Division Health Inspector
.in Western may have committed a trespass while on the property
of the corporation.
The commercial nature of Western's operations does not
remove it from the open fields doctrine since the doctrine has
been applied successfully to the open fields of commercial prem-
ises.40
The nature of an open field had been defined through a series
of cases, several of which were decided after Katz.4 The grounds
surrounding a plant were found not subject to fourth amendment
protection,*" nor was the chimney of a barbecue in a backyard,4"
or the top of a foundation block only a foot or two removed from
the open fields."
The inspection at Western was made from the grounds sur-
rounding the plant, an area which is not cloaked with constitu-
tional protection. Nor was the evidence which the inspector
viewed within a constitutionally protected area since the emis-
sions were in the atmosphere immediately above the plants, not
unlike evidence discovered in an open field. Therefore the inspec-
tion made by the Division on Western's premises did not consti-
tute an unreasonable search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.
The open fields doctrine was not superceded by the Katz
decision, for, as stated above, courts cannot analyze one's reason-
officer of the law to enter upon private property, his conduct, otherwise a trespass, is
justifiable." Koth v. United States, 16 F.2d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1926) held: "The fact that
the officers may have been trespassors does not exclude the evidence ....
4 McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1967) held:
Although the Supreme Court has recently expanded the Fourth Amendment
protection of the business enterprise, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87
S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967), it has not expanded such protection
beyond that which a private dwelling and the curtilage thereof is likewise
entitled. Therefore, a search of open fields, without a search warrant, even
if such fields are construed as part of a commercial enterprise, is not consti-
tutionally "unreasonable."
,1 The concept of curtilage has often controlled the decision of where the constitu-
tional protection of an area ends and the open fields begin. Curtilage is a small area of
land around a dwelling house, not necessarily enclosed, including the buildings used for
domestic or family purposes. See James v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 239, 234 P.2d 422 (1951).
The curtilage of a dwelling is entitled to the protection of the fourth amendment. How-
ever, manufacturing plants such as Western are said to have no curtilage. See United
States v. Vlahos, 19 F. Supp. 166, 170 (D. Ore. 1937).
42 Monnette v. United States, 229 F.2d 847, 850 (5th Cir. 1962).
,4 People v. Alexander, 253 Cal. App. 2d 691, 61 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1967).
" Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
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able expectations of privacy without taking into account the na-
ture of the place investigated. The 1973 decision of United States
v. Brown 5 declares: "[T]he 'Open Fields Doctrine' still prevails.
Search of open fields without a search warrant is not unreasona-
ble and is not constitutionally impermissible."4
The amended Air Pollution Control Act of 1970 7 which re-
quires a warrant or consent prior to entry upon any property,
premises, or place for inspection purposes," affects the open fields
doctrine in that inspections made from any part of a company's
property must be pursuant to a warrant or consent. The statute
does not, however, address the question of whether inspections
made from open fields of an adjoining property owner or an ad-
joining public right-of-way may be made only pursuant to con-
sent or warrant. Under the open fields doctrine, the adjacent
public right-of-way is not a constitutionally protected area, and
observations of emissions from such a location would not be viola-
tive of the fourth amendment.
B. Plain View Doctrine
The plain view doctrine holds that evidence fully disclosed
and open to the eye is not subject to fourth amendment protec-
tion because no search is required to obtain such evidence.
49
People v. Rosenthal0 distinguished the warrantless search by a
building inspector of the interior of an apartment house from his
observations of the exterior of the apartment house. The court
explained that a "'[s]earch' implies a prying into hidden places
for that which is concealed and it is not a search to observe that
which is open to view."'" Evidence relating to the garage and
porches of the apartment house was found to be admissible while
evidence discovered on the interior of the same building was con-
stitutionally inadmissible. Expressing similar conclusions about
evidence found in plain view, United States v. Vilhottill held:
"The two most important variables in deciding whether a visual
search contravenes the Fourth Amendment are accessibility to
473 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1973).
46 Id. at 954.
'1 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-1 to -26 (Supp. 1971), as amended, ch. 212-13,
11973] Colo. Sess. Laws 736-43.
" Id. at § 66-31-10(2)(d).
" Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F.
Supp. 425 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 210, 47 N.E.2d 56, 59 (1943).
59 Misc. 2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1969).
, Id. at 964.
, 323 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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view and the nature of the premises.""3 Katz verified the continu-
ing validity of the plain view doctrine by stating, "[wihat a
person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection."54
The inspection made at Western was a plain view observa-
tion since the emissions were visible whether one was on or off the
premises. 5 Katz held that one's expectation of privacy must be
reasonable for there to be an unconstitutional search." Such an
expectation cannot be justified when the objects or activities
viewed are knowingly exposed to the public.57 Western therefore
had no justifiable expectation of privacy, and the evidence which
was in plain view was not constitutionally protected.
The amendment to the Air Pollution (Control Act" does not
affect the operation of the plain view doctrine as long as observa-
tions of this kind are made from a point outside of the property,
premises, or place owned by the party being inspected.
IV. WAS DUE PROCESS VIOLATED?
It has been well established that due process extends to ad-
ministrative hearings such as the one Western was given before
the Air Pollution Variance Board. 9 Equally well settled is the fact
that corporations such as Western are entitled to the protection
of due process of law.6 0
The Division's claim in Western was supported by the uncor-
roborated testimony of one individual who observed emissions for
approximately ten minutes. Western had no knowledge of this
inspection until 2 weeks later when it received the cease and
desist order. The Variance Board permitted Western to introduce
0 Id. at 431.
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
0 Brief for Petitioner for Certiorari at 13, Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., cert. denied by the Colorado Supreme Court, June 25, 1973.
, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
Id. at 351.
See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-10(2)(d) (Supp. 1971), amending, COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 66-29-8(2)(d) (Supp. 1967).
11 Shoenberg Farms, Inc. v. People ex rel. Swisher, 166 Colo. 199, 212, 444 P.2d 277,
283 (1968); Puncec v. City & County of Denver, 28 Colo. App. 542, 544, 475 P.2d 359, 360
(1970); People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 146-47, 190 N.E. 301, 303 (1934).
' Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928); Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Para-
mount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 550 (1923); Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd.
Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896); Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Cline, 9 F.2d 176,
177 (D. Colo. 1925). Due process as used in this comment refers to either the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution of the United States or Section 25, Article 2 of the Consti-
tution of the State of Colorado, unless one or the other is specified.
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evidence of an independent engineering test conducted 2 months
after the Division inspection, but the report was objected to be-
cause the test was conducted without notification to the Depart-
ment of Health. This resulted in the Division's not having person-
nel present to determine if the method of testing was acceptable."'
The transcript from the hearing indicates that even had Western
notified the Division that a test was being conducted, the Vari-
ance Board would not have considered the results probative. The
Variance Board focused its attention primarily upon the evidence
gathered by the Division on June 4. The transcript illustrates:
MR. HEATON: When you made your visit on June 4, 1969 and
made these observations, and you as a certified air pollution ob-
server, these emissions did or did not exeed the state standards and
the state air pollution control act?
MR. CAWELTI: They did exceed.2
MR. HEATON: The violation, I think, is June 4. You did not pres-
ent evidence that you were not in violation on June 4.
MR. CAWELTI: Of course, I think we all have to realize that it is
physically impossible, because we didn't even know that we were
being examined on June 4, and it wasn't until some 20 days later
that we had been examined on that day, because it is a matter of
history by the time we heard we were being charged for it."
MR. HEATON: Let me talk about the law on June 4. The specific
law on June 4. As the law on that date, and as it reads on June 16.
Could you have been in violation on those dates?
MR. CAWELTI: Yes. Our own view is that we were not, and our own
testimony is that we were not.
MR. HEATON: No your testimony was that you were not in viola-
tion in August. I don't have the date of that report, but it was
August."
Paragraph 2 of the Air Pollution Variance Board's Findings
of Fact states:
Ringelmann and Opacity readings for a period in excess of three
minutes were taken by personnel of the Colorado Department of
Health on June 4, 1969, and all such readings were in excess of a
Ringelmann 2 and an Opacity of 40%.11
Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., Civil No. 19974 (Colo. Dist.
Ct., filed Nov. 18, 1971). CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-5(2)(e) (Supp. 1969) requires that
in order for a person to avail himself of the independent testing, the method of such testing
be acceptable to the Division.
62 See State of Colorado Department of Public Health, Air Pollution Variance Board
for transcript of proceedings in the Air Pollution Variance Board hearing records from In
re Western Alfalfa Corp., Sept. 11, 1969, at 33.
Record, Oct. 16, 1969, at 8-9, In re Western Alfalfa Corp.
64 Id. at 12.
Air Pollution Variance Board, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in In re
Western Alfalfa Corp., Jan. 30, 1970, at 2.
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The preceding illustrates that the Variance Board rendered
exclusive probative value to the evidence submitted by the Divi-
sion inspector of the test made June 4.
Morgan v. United States6 states that "in administrative pro-
ceedings of a quasi-judicial character the liberty and property of
the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements
of fair play. These demand 'a fair and open hearing. .'.. ," Due
process "secures the individual 'from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles
of private rights and distributive justice.' ,,18 Several facts must
be considered in assessing the fairness of the investigation and
resultant trial of Western Alfalfa Corporation.
A. The Ringelmann Test: Notice and Certification
The district court noted that the Division objected to the
independent engineering test of Western because it was done
without notification to the Department of Health, and as a conse-
quence the Division had no personnel present to determine if the
method of testing was acceptable. The district court concluded,
"If this be objectionable, then it is likewise objectionable if the
Department of Health makes its examination of opacity and pol-
lutants without the presence of personnel of the person or com-
pany being examined for possible violations of the Air Pollution
Control Act.""6 Implicit in the court's comment is the notion of
fairness. While the statute suggests protection of the Division
against the self-justifying instincts of the citizens, nothing in the
statute protects the citizens against the unhampered zeal of an
administrative officer intent upon discovering, and possibly in-
venting, violations of the Air Pollution Control Act.
Another fact to consider is that the State of Colorado permits
certification of experts in the use of the Ringelmann Chart, but
certifies only persons employed by the State.70 This certification
of the State employees authenticates their credentials. Though
an individual not employed by the State may have gone through
the very same training as a certified expert, his qualifications lack
the aura of authentication implied by the credentials of a State
e 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
'7 Id. at 14-15.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 93 Colo. 128, 132, 25 P.2d
187, 188 (1933), appeal dismissed, 291 U.S. 650 (1933).
,1 Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., Civil No. 19974 (Colo. Dist.
Ct., filed Nov. 18, 1971).
70 Id.
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employee. While the fact of certification may not preclude chal-
lenge to the testimony of a State-employed expert, it would cer-
tainly increase the burden one must bear in challenging such
testimony. Certification adds credence to the testimony of the
State's witness. One must question whether the testimony of a
"non-certified" smoke reader would have inherently been at some
disadvantage simply because of the "non-certification"? The un-
fairness of such a situation is palpable.
B. The Evidentiary Quandary
Since the Act permits a decision of the Variance Board to be
based exclusively upon evidence obtained in three minutes of any
hour,7 there was no opportunity for Western to verify or challenge
what the enforcement officer actually saw on June 4. Further, the
Variance Board refused to accept the evidence gathered on dates
other than the date of the Division inspection. Without an oppor-
tunity to monitor the State test and simultaneously make its own
readings, a company under investigation is at an insurmountable
disadvantage. Thus, the entire case of the Division rested upon
the unsubstantiated and unverified testimony of a single individ-
ual of an observation lasting no more than ten minutes. In these
circumstances, the sole defense remaining to Western was to im-
peach the expert witness by challenging his qualifications or the
manner in which he conducted the test.7 2 Since the witness' quali-
fications were validated by his certification and his method of
testing was unverified by other witnesses, the burden resting
upon Western was very heavy. It is no exaggeration to suggest,
as did the court of appeals, that Western was absolutely fore-
closed from negating the testimony of the Division.
Counsel for Western claimed that the investigatory and no-
tice procedure followed in this case was not unlike a motorist
receiving notice that he had violated a traffic ordinance by receiv-
ing a citation in the mail 2 weeks after the alleged violation had
"1 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-5(2)(a) (Supp. 1967), as amended, CoLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 66-31-9 (Supp. 1971).
11 Apparently Western was unable to prove the nature of its emissions on June 4
by submitting evidence of the amount of alfalfa processed, the day's fuel consumption,
or other records of the day's operations. Testing in this manner is not specifically author-
ized by statute, and it is questionable whether records of operations on that day or a
similar day would even begin to withstand a challenge based upon evidence gathered in
an actual physical inspection on June 4. Any attempt to simulate the actual conditions
existing as of June 4 would probably be doomed to countless variables such as wind
direction and speed, time of day, amount of alfalfa processed, etc.
1974
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occurred. 3 The Division argued that the "only way a company
can stay in continuous compliance with the Pollution Control
laws is to constantly monitor its own emissions."' The Division
reasoned that since the law required Western to be in compliance,
it should have known of any 3-minute interval when it was not
in compliance. In answer, Western argued, "By the same logic, a
driver of a car should be able to recall and to specifically testify
as to what speed he was driving at a particular time on a day two
weeks in the past." 5 Moreover, any role Western might have
attempted at constantly monitoring its emissions would have
been seriously undermined by the fact that its own experts were
not certified.
The procedure used against Western was not unlike an ex
parte investigation by an administrative hearing board where evi-
dence is collected without notice being given. In such instances,
courts have held that the aggrieved party was deprived of his
right, under due process of law, to refute, test, or explain the
opposing party's evidence." Basic fairness dictates that Western
should have been entitled to a "reasonable" opportunity to refute
the Division's evidence. Even assuming there was a violation on
June 4, there should have been some way Western could have
known sooner that it was committing such a violation. In addi-
tion, the 2-week delay, in itself, seems inconsistent with the Act's
manifest intention to curb air pollution. By its remissiveness in
failing to notify Western immediately, the Division itself may
have contributed to a continuing violation of the Air Pollution
Control Act.
C. An Evidentiary Analogy
Since the evidence in cases like this is continually dissipating
into the atmosphere, a comparison may be made to the evidence
sought when a blood-alcohol test is administered. With the pas-
sage of time, the intoxicating effect of alcohol in the blood dimin-
ishes as does the evidence of pollutants in the sky. The efficacy
of the blood test depends upon its being made in close proximity
to the time of the offense. Similarly, the probative value of an air
pollution test depends upon a close proximity in time to the al-
" Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 14, Air Pollution Variance Bd. v.
Western Alfalfa Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114 (1974).
" Brief for Air Pollution Variance Board for Certiorari as Amicus Curiae at 15-16, Air
Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114 (1974).
," Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Certiorari at 14, Air Pollution Variance Bd.
v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114 (1974).
" English v. City of Long Beach, 35 Cal. 2d 155, 217 P.2d 22 (1950).
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leged violation. In the blood test cases, it has been held that the
accused party "should be entitled to a reasonable opportunity to
attempt to procure a timely sample. . . . [T]o refuse him such
reasonable opportunity is to deny him the only opportunity he
has to defend against the charge."77 If denied the opportunity
upon request to see his own doctor, "it may be said that the
[defendant has been] denied the essentials of governmental fair
play."" In the same manner, a party suspected of an air pollution
violation should have the benefit of his own timely witness. To
deny him that witness is to curtail his only opportunity to effec-
tively rebut the evidence gathered against him.
D. A Secret Investigation
In essence, what was conducted by the Division on June 4
was a secret investigation. It has been held in cases under the
fourth amendment that "[slecret searches have never been a
part of our system of government. . . . [T]he secret search is
such an extraordinary procedure under the Fourth Amendment
that basic decency and the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures embodied in that Amendment require that
prompt and adequate notice after the search must be given to
[the enforced parties]."" While the type of investigation con-
ducted at Western is not proscribed by the fourth amendment,
the rationale underlying the notice requirements is still directly
applicable. In either case it makes no difference to the aggrieved
party whether the inspection is termed a search or simply an
inspection. What is important is that timely notice be given after
the inspection has been made. "[T]o delay notice to the subject
of the search for a substantial period of time because it might
hamper an investigation is in our view well beyond the bounds of
the Constitution. ' 80 By delaying notice of the investigation at
Western's plant the Division seriously impaired Western's de-
fense, perhaps suppressing evidence that would have "cleared"
Western.
[Liaw enforcement agencies also have a responsibility to protect as
well as to prosecute; . . . when in the exercise of their power to
arrest, the police deprive the arrested person of the opportunity to
obtain evidence that might establish his innocence, they are sup-
pressing it just as effectively as if it did exist and they withheld it;
11 In re Newbern, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 866, 1 Cal. Rptr. 80, 83 (1959).
79 Id.
7' United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Id. at 369.
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• . . evidence should be equally available to prove innocence as well
as guilt .... 11
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this comment is not to propose a detailed
outline of the manner and timing of what would constitute ade-
quate notice to a party being investigated for possible violation
of the Air Pollution Control Act, but only to emphasize that the
2-week delay in the present case was too long under any circum-
stance. It is not urged that notice must be given prior to or at the
same time as the Division conducts a test, but only within a
reasonably short period of time thereafter so as not to deprive the
party of his right to a fair trial.
Counsel for the Division has argued that surprise is a crucial
element in conducting tests of this kind, and that notice would
unnecessarily restrict the prosecution of air pollution violations.
82
Contrary to this assumption is the fact that most violations which
the Division cites are the consequence of'a malfunction in the
mechanical operation of a plant which, unless corrected, tend to
be of a continuing nature.13 Surprise therefore plays little role in
the day-to-day enforcement of the Air Pollution Control Act.
The requirement of notice in this context does not mean that
such notice is required in other regulatory contexts. "There is a
tendency to think that there is and should be one type of proce-
dure and review for all administrative agencies. This is a great
mistake founded on insufficient understanding of the field of
administrative law."" What constitutes adequate due process in
each situation depends upon "the purposes of the procedure and
its effect upon the rights asserted and all other circumstances
which may render the proceeding appropriate to the nature of the
case. '" When visual opacity readings are made, notice should be
a requisite element of the procedure envisioned by law. Without
notice, the rights of the affected parties are seriously impaired.
The fact that this evidence is, by its nature, continually dissipat-
-1 78 A.L.R.2d 906 (1961). For a full discussion of this point see the cases collected at
Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 905 (1961).
82 Brief for Petitioner for Certiorari at 9, Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa
Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114 (1974).
u Interview with John Spiegel, Air Pollution Control Specialist, Stationary Sources
Section, Air Pollution Control Division, Colorado State Department of Health, in Denver,
December 17, 1973.
" Crow v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 343, 140 P.2d 321, 325 (1943) (Wolfe,
C.J., concurring specially.)
" Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944).
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ing, renders the notice element crucial to a fair investigation.
Administrative agencies are instruments of power. They rep-
resent the possibility of great public good, but also the possibility
of public evil."' The procedure under which the State Health
Department is now permitted to enforce air pollution regulations
in the State of Colorado has inherent potential for great abuse.
The statute does not require notice in all situations. Without
notice, accused parties after an inspection may be left with the
impression they have been raided by government agents. Instead
of promoting an atmosphere of cooperation, the current procedure
nurtures a climate in which distrust and antagonism can readily
develop.
Fair play must be assigned an active role in the daily enforce-
ment of the air pollution regulations. While it is necessary to
protect the quality of the environment and particularly the air we
breathe, we must guard against the unfettered zeal of administra-
tive agencies. Such zeal, unchecked, could easily transgress the
rudimentary safeguards guaranteed by due process of law.
Leland P. Anderson
' Bikle, Safeguarding Private Interest in Administrative Procedure, 25 WAsH. U.L.Q.
321, 339 (1940).

